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Abstract 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services acting through the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and in collaboration with the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) was tasked with 
delivering a report on an appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework for health 
information technology. An expert stakeholder group was established under the auspices of 
the Health Information Technology (IT) Policy Committee to help provide input into the 
development of this framework. The three agencies were asked to take into account this 
input, and to use it to help Health and Human Services put forward a risk-based regulatory 
framework, including how healthcare IT systems could be stratified in terms of risk, and 
recommendations about how the regulatory requirements currently in place should be 
adapted. In this paper, we summarize the public deliberations and final public report of the 
expert stakeholder group, and conclude with key suggestions intended to address the charge 
to recommend the features of a risk-based regulatory framework that promote innovation, 
protect patient safety, and avoid regulatory duplication. 
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Perspective 
On the 9th of July 2012, President Barack Obama signed into law the Food and Drug 
Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA).(1) This legislation enhanced the 
FDA’s powers to protect and promote patients’ interests by expediting the development and 
review of new medical devices. The Secretary of Health and Human Services acting through 
the FDA, and in collaboration with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and 
Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC), was tasked with delivering a 
report that contained “a proposed strategy and recommendations on an appropriate, risk-based regulatory 
framework pertaining to health information technology, including mobile medical applications, that promotes 
innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids regulatory duplication”.(1) Recognizing the importance 
of stakeholder involvement, the FDA set up the public-private FDASIA working group 
under the ONC’s Health IT Policy Committee.(2) The purpose of this group, which was 
subject to Federal Advisory Committee regulations, was to gather expert input from a wide 
variety of relevant stakeholders including patients, consumers, healthcare providers and IT 
vendors, to help guide the FDA on the development of such a framework. The group was 
keen to avoid any regulatory duplication, as a number of different organisations are already 
responsible for assuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices (FDA), and testing 
and certifying of products (ONC). With publication of this Health IT report now imminent, 
we reflect on the key recommendations of the FDASIA working group that were made in 
response to this charge as well as identify the actions necessary to make the risk-based 
regulatory framework work without stifling innovation.  
 
What Health IT should be subject to a risk-based regulatory framework? 
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The FDASIA working group described a taxonomy for considering the parameters 
of Health IT and consequently what Health IT products should be considered for a risk-
based regulatory framework.(3) A number of guiding principles were intended to be applied 
to these Health IT products, including a set of defining characteristics such as product 
categories and intended use. If the intended use of the Health IT product was to inform or 
change decision making about initiating, discontinuing, modifying, or avoiding care 
interventions or personal health management, then it was considered within the scope of the 
framework. Electronic Health Records (EHRs), intelligent intravenous (IV) pumps, closed-
loop insulin pump with implanted continuous glucose monitors, and a mHealth Nutrition 
app were all given as examples of Health IT products that could possibly be subject to a risk-
based regulatory framework, whereas disease registries and claims processing software were 
considered out-of-scope (Table 1).  
 
How can Health IT be stratified in terms of risk? 
 
The FDASIA working group developed a new framework enumerating various 
important factors that could influence the potential risk of patient harm (combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm). These included, for 
example, the purpose of the software product; intended user(s); severity of injury; likelihood 
of hazardous situation arising; and complexity of implementation and upgrades (see Table 2). 
The framework did not weight or “calculate” any specific risk score for a given product, but 
rather served to highlight the key considerations when evaluating the use of a new system. 
The matrix characterized the relative risk (i.e., “lower risk”, “medium risk”, or “higher risk”) 
of certain conditions of each risk factor and served as directional guidance only. Software 
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may be considered complex in terms of implementation, upgrades and maintenance, and 
thus considered harder to classify. This was somewhat understandable given: (i) the greater 
effort and expertise required to implement this software, (ii) their variable context of use, 
and (iii) the existence of numerous interfaces to other systems. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
determine when a product is in final form, and balance the risk that arises from installation 
and implementation issues with that inherent at the product inception. For example, the 
“build” and configuration of an EHRs was considered complex and assigned a ‘higher risk’ 
(e.g., greater number of people exposed and number of processes involved) compared to 
that of a closed-loop insulin pump with implanted continuous glucose monitor, which was 
assigned a ‘medium risk’. Automated decision-making, which is synonymous with intelligent 
intravenous (IV) pumps, was also considered complex and assigned a ‘higher risk’ compared 
to that of a mHealth Nutrition app, which provided information only and was assigned a 
‘lower risk’.  
 
What current regulatory frameworks are in place? 
 
The Center for Devices and Radiological Health of the FDA is responsible for 
assuring the safety, effectiveness and proper labeling of medical devices and radiation-
emitting products marketed in the U.S. A product will be regulated as a medical device if it 
meets the definition set out in the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (see Box 1). A 
medical device can be assigned to one of three classes i.e., Class I, II, and III, depending on 
its intended use and its indications for use.(2) Regulatory control increases from Class I to 
Class III. For example, approximately 74% of Class I devices (which pose a low risk of 
illness or injury) are exempt from the premarket notification process,(2) whereas most Class 
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III devices (which are considered to pose a greater risk) require premarket approval. 
Although the FDA’s regulatory requirements can help ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices, the FDASIA working group highlighted how such regulations were geared 
especially, but not exclusively, to physical devices. It was felt that this could stifle the pace 
and diffusion of innovation, or otherwise discourage manufacturers from introducing new 
software to the market. The group therefore suggested that Health IT should not be subject 
to FDA premarket notification, except for: (i) medical device accessories, (ii) certain forms 
of high risk clinical decision support, such as Computer Aided Diagnostics, and (iii) higher 
risk software, where the intended use elevates the aggregated risk. The group also 
recommended that the FDA define the scope of regulations for each of these suggested 
exemptions listed above. A robust post-market surveillance mechanism, with post-
implementation testing to track adverse events and near misses, was also recommended.  
The ONC Certification Program set the standards, implementation specifications 
and certification criteria that EHRs must include, at a minimum, to support the achievement 
of Meaningful Use.(4) To qualify for the financial incentives offered under the Medicare and 
Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs,(5) health care professionals and hospitals must both 
adopt Certified EHRs and demonstrate meaningful use of this technology. A number of 
organizations are involved in testing and certifying EHR products, including the Accredited 
Testing Laboratories and Authorized Certification Bodies, respectively. The FDASIA 
working group commented on how certifying specific test behaviors can limit innovation, 
favoring existing software with defined “best practice” features. The group suggested 
providing more flexibility around compliance to accommodate new Health IT 
developments, and greater transparency and predictability of candidate standards that are 
being considered for possible adoption. It was also recommended that the ONC, FDA and 
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FCC should avoid any regulatory duplication, as it is possible for the same medical device to 
be brought independently before all agencies.  
 
Are there better ways to assure that innovation is permitted to bloom, local and national accountability 
encouraged, and safety promoted?  
 
The FDASIA working group was clear that any new regulatory framework for 
Health IT should promote innovation. Transparency of products and results was proposed 
as one way in which innovation could be stimulated. The availability of comparative 
information about a particular product, for example, could drive choice and help healthcare 
organizations improve their performance. The working group highlighted how national 
standards for quality processes should also be measurable and transparent. Standards and 
specifications that support interoperability could help bring more proposed solutions to 
market; industry participation in the development of such standards was encouraged. The 
working group also recommended more local Health IT configuration and integration, as 
well as more control and accountability for outcomes of use. This included the ability to 
iteratively develop, design, test and implement changes to meet users’ needs. Furthermore, 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems for 
Better Care recommended the reporting of health IT-related adverse events by vendors and 
users to identify and rectify vulnerabilities that threaten safety.(6) This was echoed by the 
working group who emphasized the importance of non-punitive reporting of safety issues 
and the aggregation of these data at a national level to help drive outcome improvements.  
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More research is needed to explore the root cause of Health IT system-related errors, 
and the huge challenges that surround the secure exchange of confidential clinical 
information among disparate systems and healthcare settings. Addressing key gaps in EHR 
functionality is essential for all healthcare providers, and broader access to safety and system 
performance data is needed to facilitate timely improvements. In response to this Health and 
Human Services report, the health informatics community may be encouraged to develop 
and adopt best practices in the safe design, deployment and use of EHRs, as well as share 
information about obstacles encountered during Health IT implementations. Although 
much has been accomplished to date, considerable additional progress is needed to track 
adverse events and near misses for certain health IT functionality, and create a healthcare 
environment where patient safety is protected. Health IT developers and vendors may also 
be required to list products that represent at least some risk and encouraged to report serious 
health IT related safety events. The working group viewed the sharing of information, 
knowledge and lessons learned as fundamental to promoting safety and innovation.  
 
Future directions 
 
The next step will be for Health and Human Services to release its report for public 
commentary. This report is of great significance to the health informatics community as it 
paves the way for possible risk-based regulation of Health IT in the coming years and for 
reducing barriers to innovation. The HIT industry also has a great deal of interest in the 
recommendations.  Too much regulation could stifle innovation, while if little oversight is 
put in place, safety issues may remain uncorrected.(6) While HIT is likely highly beneficial in 
the aggregate with respect to safety, numerous untended consequences have been identified 
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of HIT,(7) and it does not necessarily result in desired benefits.   
It remains to be seen which, if any, of the recommendations the federal agencies will 
take on board and the likely impact such a report will have on the future Health IT agenda. 
We await the next developments with interest. 
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Table 1. Examples of Health IT products that may or may not be possibly subject to 
the Risk-based Regulatory Framework (3) 
 
Possibly subject to Risk based 
Regulatory Framework 
Likely not to be subject to the Risk-
based Regulatory Framework 
 EHRs (installed, SaaS)  Claims processing software 
 Hospital information systems-of-
systems 
 Health benefit eligibility software 
 Decision support algorithms  Practice management / Scheduling / 
Inventory management software 
 Visualization tools for anatomic, 
tissue images, medical imaging and 
waveforms 
 General purpose communication 
applications (e.g., e-mail, paging) 
used by health professionals 
 Health information exchange 
software 
 Software using historical claims data 
to predict future utilization / cost of 
care 
 Electronic/robotic patient care 
assistants 
 Cost effectiveness analytic software 
 Templating software tools for digital 
image surgical planning 
 Electronic guideline distribution 
 Disease registries 
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Table 2. Framework for Risk and Innovation Dimensions of Assessing Risk by 
Patient Harm (3) 
 
 Lower risk Medium Risk Higher Risk/More Attention 
Purpose of software 
product 
Information-only; purpose is 
transparent and clear 
Makes recommendations to user 
Automated decision making (e.g., 
intelligent IV pump, AED) 
Intended user(s) 
Targeted user(s) are 
knowledgeable and can safely 
use product 
Makes recommendations to 
knowledgeable user 
Provides diagnosis or treatment advice 
directly to knowledgeable user 
Severity of injury Very low probability of harm 
Potential for non-life threatening 
adverse event 
Life-threatening potential 
Likelihood of 
hazardous situation 
arising 
Rare 
(<1 per 10,000 patient-years) 
Unpredictable, but hazardous 
situation arises > 1:10K pt-yrs 
and < once a year 
Common 
(arises once per year) 
Transparency of 
software operations, 
data and included 
content providers 
Software output is easy to 
understand and its 
“calculation” (data and 
algorithm) transparent 
Software operates transparently 
and output is understandable by 
software expert 
“Black box” 
Ability to mitigate 
harmful conditions 
Human intermediary 
knowledgeable and 
empowered to intervene to 
prevent harm 
Human intermediary may be 
(but not routinely) involved 
Closed loop (no human intervention) 
Complexity of 
software and its 
maintenance 
Application of mature, widely 
adopted technologies with 
information output that is easy 
to understand by the user 
Medium complexity. Testing 
procedures exist that reliably 
assess patient-safety risk profile 
of product. 
Complexity of data collection and 
“transformation” involved in producing 
output is significant. Difficult to test 
reliably for all safety risks 
Complexity of 
implementation and 
upgrades 
The “build” and configuration 
of the software is straight-
forward and does not 
materially affect the integrity 
of the output. Safety upgrades 
can be accomplished easily. 
The “build” and configuration 
of the software is moderately 
complex, but “guard rails” 
significantly limit types of 
changes that might induce life-
threatening risk. 
The “build” and configuration of the 
software is complex and can introduce 
substantial changes that can induce 
serious risk. Limited or no “guard rails.” 
Complexity of 
training and use 
The software system output is 
clear and easy to interpret. 
Minimal training needed. 
Moderate complexity. Less than 
2 hr of training required. 
The complexity of the user interface and 
density of data presented can cause 
important errors or oversights that can 
lead to serious risk. Formal training 
necessary. 
Use as part of more 
comprehensive 
software/hardware 
system 
Used as a standalone product, 
or output is unambiguously 
used as part of larger 
integrated system. Certified to 
specific hardware. 
Redundancy reduces single 
points of failure. 
Software interacts with 1-3 other 
systems with mature, well 
described interfaces. 
Almost always used as part of a larger 
software system AND output is subject 
to interpretation or can be configured in 
multiple ways whose mis-interpretation 
may induce harm (e.g., DDI thresholds) 
Network 
connectivity, 
standards, security 
Wired and wireless licensed 
spectrum 
Wireless spectrum that is 
licensed by rule with interference 
protection and low risk of 
harmful interference. 
Wireless unlicensed spectrum, which has 
no protection from harmful interference. 
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Box 1. Definition of a Medical Device 
 
A device is:  
"an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or 
related article, including a component part, or accessory which is:    
 recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopoeia, or any 
supplement to them, 
 intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or 
 intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does 
not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or 
other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its 
primary intended purposes."(8)  
 
